Transfer of managerial models by foreign industrialists to South Russia in the late 19th -early 20th century
The development of modern business accompanied by a managerial revolution was one of the most significant changes induced by the industrialization in all developed countries in the late 19 th -early 20 th century. Small family firms were replaced by large-scale enterprises administered by a hierarchy of salaried managers as the primary agent of organizing production and distribution. In the late 19 th century managers became important actors in a range of economic and social relations. After the second industrial revolution the new element in the system of labor relations appeared: the owner-worker binary model of labor organization was replaced by the new model of owner-manager-worker. This is why it seems to be logical to assume, that management and the layer of managers (among them many foreigners) emerged as an important economic and social factor in the development of modern, large-scale business activity and in the modernization of society in general in Russia as well.
The prominent role played by foreign investment and industrial technologies in the Russian industrialization process has been known for scholarship both in Russia and abroad. Scholars, however, have paid surprisingly little attention to the history of managerial systems and managerial revolution in the Russian Empire, including transfer of managerial models by foreign entrepreneurs.
The issue has been addressed perfunctorily, mainly in the framework of case studies focusing on individual enterprises 3 . Apart from one publication about the salaried managers in Russia in the 19 th and 20 th centuries 4 and the research project "The managers of enterprises in Russia in the early 20 th century: Historical and anthropological analysis" (director -Irina Shilnikova, 2008 , I cannot provide any other example for an overview of managerial history in Russia. Both of these studies are based mainly on materials from the Central Industrial Region of Russia and focused mainly on managers but not managerial systems. That is why I consider it highly relevant to address the history of operations management and managerial revolution in South Russia. * * * This paper investigates how foreign industrialists contributed to the transfer and implementation of managerial models and practices to South Russia in the period of pre-Soviet industrialization, how the social, economic and cultural environment reacted to these changes, and how the applied management strategy was impacted by the responses. In particular, the aim is to answer such questions as if we can attribute -using A. Chandler's term -the appearance of the "Visible hand" in Russia mainly to the foreigners, i.e. if we can evaluate the managerial revolution as a phenomenon that was mostly imported from the West? How can we define, through the prism of assessing the role of foreign businesspersons, the peculiarities of the creation of modern industrial enterprise and the appearance of professional manager class in the Russian Empire? How were the Western managerial ideas and practices adapted to Russian reality?
The research is focused on the geographical area called Southern Industrial Region in the Russian Empire. This included the provinces of Ekaterinoslavskaya, Khersonskaya, Tavricheskaya and Kharkovskaya 5 . By the end of the 19 th century -besides such centers as Moscow and Petersburg -this region became the main area and channel for the transfer and adaptation of Western European models of industrial production, having outrun the Ural Region in volumes, rates and innovations.
The chronological framework covers the decades between 1880 and 1918: from the end of the first industrial revolution in Russia to the time of the mass-nationalization of enterprises.
The present research is based on the analysis of industrial censuses and further official statistics, as well as unpublished sources housed in local Ukrainian archives providing information for case studies.
The Chinese philosopher Confucius said that the most difficult thing among all is to find a black cat in a dark room, especially if there is no cat. The researcher of operations management in Russia can easily feel as if he was searching for such a cat. I was working with the manufacturing documentation of many enterprises in Ukrainian archives and the amount of direct information I found about managerial models applied in particular plants and factories was very little. Job descriptions for managers or labor contracts only sporadically occur. It is possible, however, to reconstruct the structure of management by studying "indirect" documents such as financial statements containing bills of payed salaries. Based on such documents it can be assumed that while top-managers focused exclusively on administrative matters, middle-and low-level managers used to combine engineering responsibilities with managerial ones and they were employed primarily as engineers.
Another possible explanation for the weak reflection of the managerial element in the documents is the fact that the problem of effective management by itself appeared not earlier than in the late 19 th and early 20 th century. In the preindustrial and industrial era manual workers dominated. Managers constituted only a small percentage of the total number of employees, and their work was considered as a priori effective, even if it was not 6 . Turning to the above mentioned indirect sources, one can apply a method similar to the one formulated for discovering planets in astronomy based on Doppler spectroscopy. According to this method, smaller object (such as an extrasolar planet) orbiting a larger object (such as a star) could produce changes in the position and velocity of the latter as they orbit their common center of mass.
The same holds true for management history: it is possible to address the topic based on the history of the development of modern business, which is satisfactorily represented in the sources. According to the theory of management revolution, the development of modern business enterprises determined the development of modern management. Consequently, it is important to answer the questions whether traditional small family firms were replaced by large-scale enterprises administered by a hierarchy of salaried managers in Russia. If yes -when, and what kind of role foreigners played in this process? THE dEVElOPMENT OF MOdERN BUSINESS IN RUSSIA Alfred Chandler, in his theory of managerial revolution, distinguished two types of entrepreneurship: traditional and modern one. According to his definition, modern business has two specific characteristics: it contains many distinct operating units and it is managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives. Each unit has its own administrative office administered by a full-time salaried manager, and its own set of books and accounts. Thus, in theory, each unit could operate as an independent enterprise. In contrast, the traditional firm consisted of one single unit. The shop, factory, bank, or transportation line was operated by an individual or a small num-ber of owners from a single office. Normally this type of firm was focused on the production of one product type, and operated in one geographic area 7 . Contemporary publication of lists of plants and factories (so called "Lists of plants and factories") created on the basis of industrial censuses and other statistical surveys provide information on the proportion of different types of enterprises, the time of their foundation, and on the owners 8 . This is enough to find out whether traditional family enterprises were replaced by modern ones, and if yes, when and in what extent.
By entering the data from the industrial census of manufacturing in 1900 into a relative database system and analyzing it, the following can be concluded (Table 1) : among the plants and factories located in the four South Russian provinces (a total of 1290) in 1900 85% belonged to single and joint owners. The share of corporative ownership is less than 15%. Though by the beginning of the 20 th century multiunit business enterprises owned by stock-companies started to replace gradually the small traditional enterprise, still the traditional individual (family) entrepreneurship was the dominant form. Most industrial enterprises were concentrated in the hands of a sole owner or co-owners, but the largest companies were possessed by stock companies, and the lion's share 9 of the production and workers was focused there.
The first stock companies appeared in the Russian Empire under the rule of Peter the Great and in the late 18 th -early 19 th century a legislative provision of stock companies' activities took place. Still, before the beginning of the industrialization there were only a few joint-stock companies in the industrial business. Most of them appeared in South of Russia after 1890 (see Figure 1 ). 9 Though data in Table 1 show that the share of stock companies in the production output was about 25 %, these materials, based on industrial census in 1900 essentially understate the share of joint-stock companies. According to the opinion widespread in the scholarly literature only small businesses were not taken into account when compiling the "Lists of Plants and Factories". My comparison of lists from various years have however revealed that the largest blast-furnace smelters were omitted for some reason from the "Lists …" from 1900. If at least three of the largest plants are included into the calculations, industrial stock companies appear to be the leading ones in terms of production and of the number of workers.
There were examples of transforming traditional enterprises into modern ones, such as one of the largest iron-mechanical plant in the city of Elisavetgrad in Khersonskaya province. It was founded in 1875 by British citizens Robert and Thomas Elvorti. In the factories' lists from 1900 10 . In most cases however, stock companies in Russia owning industrial enterprises were founded as completely new enterprises without any precedents. It can be concluded that the formation of modern business and, as a consequence, managerial revolution took place in two streams: 1) through the evolution of the traditional family business into corporative ones and 2) founding stock companies by shareholders from "outside". It could be both Russian and foreign banks, foreign industrial companies, private businesses.
The development of stock capital led to a new diversified type of ownership and its separation from the management. The average size of corporative enterprises was 358 workers in contrast with the 45 workers of single and partnership-owned factories (Table 2) . Owners were not able to manage directly such a large group of people and stock company management acquired a professional character. Stock companies were more attracted by the technology industry, which sounds fairly reasonable, as building machine and metallurgy plants required large-scale long-term investment, usually not possessed by a sole entrepreneur. The solution lied in associating capital, technology, and management.
Such enterprises were characterized by a complex structure that demanded a hierarchy of salaried executives -professional managers. Based on lists of office workers stored in archival collections it is possible to reconstruct the structure of some particular enterprises. For example, the managerial structure of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant in 1916 -one of the largest plants in the region -was very complex, with departments, subdepartments and a hierarchy of professional managers. Each unit within the plant had its own administrative office, some of them were even housed separately from the main buildings of the plant. Theoretically each could operate as an independent business enterprise 11 . Considering the structure of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant and some other major companies we can say that by the beginning of World War I there existed modern enterprises in South Russia, which were characterized by a standard functional division of production: research and development, production, marketing, finance and accounting.
The joint-stock form of entrepreneurial activity arrived to Russia as an already fully formed institution after several centuries of development by European lawyers and merchants 12 . The adoption of this type of business organization by itself can be considered as a transfer of Western innovation. The following section will investigate further the role played by the "foreign factor" in the process of managerial revolution.
TRANSFER ANd AdAPTATION OF MANAgERIAl PRACTICES
First of all it is important to find out how many foreign operations managers were working in the Russian Empire. According to researcher John MacKay, who studied thoroughly the archives of foreign companies working in Russia, a large number of foreign entrepreneurs were present in Russia. They copied the structure and the principles of management of the Western companies 13 , and spent significant amounts for administrative and engineering services. In John MacKay's opinion, the explanation for this was that the main advantage of employing a foreign manager over a Russian one lied not only in the higher professional level of the former, but in his superiority in the field of ethics. Foreign managers were often described as persons for whom the administration of a public corporation was a profession, not a "fief to be plundered" 14 .
Based on the analysis of memoirs however, the general perception of the level of Russian dishonesty appears to be overestimated. . Some Russian engineers explained the dominance of foreign managers by the necessity "to protect the secrecy of production" 17 . Furthermore, if turning to the actual numbers, it appears that the share of foreigners among all operations top-management employees in South Russia was not that significant. According to the approximate data collected by the Department of Trade and Manufactures of the Ministry of Finance, in the climax of the Russian industrialization the proportion of foreign top-managers in South Russia did not exceed 10%. Although in high-tech production, such as iron-making and machinery building, it increased up to 28%, most of the managers were Russian even there (see Table 3 ). The largest iron-making and machinery plants, however, were mostly managed by foreigners -this can be an explanation for the perception of the dominance of foreign managers' manifest in some sources. Nevertheless, in many cases even if the director of the plant was Russian, he had been educated abroad. A characteristic example is that of one of the most outstanding Russian engineers, the top-manager Aleksey Goryainov. Before being appointed to the position of the director in the Alexandrovsky South Russian plant in Ekaterinoslav (1887) 20 . The most important question is whether factories managed by foreign managers proved to be more effective than those managed by Russians. Unfortunately there are almost no direct data on this issue. It is possible however to estimate the effectiveness from indirect information, which I will do taking the group of metalworking enterprises in South Russia as an example. Table 4 shows some average data indicating the effectiveness of metalworking plants grouped according to the structure of ownership in 1908, 1910 and 1913. Stock companies were almost twice more efficient in using labor and engine as compared to single-owned enterprises. An interesting result is that single-owned companies belonging to (and managed by) Russians show no difference in efficiency from those managed by foreigners. This implies that there must have been no considerable difference in their managerial practices. It is difficult to tell however, if it were the foreign entrepreneurs who adapted to the Russian conditions or the Russian adopted quickly the Western 22 innovations. In the case of stock companies it is hardly possible to separate and compare "pure" Russian or foreign ones, because even if the company was registered as Russian, it could be foreign in every other respect. The "Nikopol-Mariupol Mining and Metallurgical Society" can be referred to as a characteristic example for this. It was established in Russia, and its board of administration was Russian too. Though the stock-company was founded in Russia, it was initiated by a German citizen, Adolf Rodshtein and an American, Edmund Smith
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. In 1914 the fixed capital totaled 15.4 million rubles, 4 million from which was possessed by Frenchmen, the share of Belgian measured 3 million, and 3 million was the share of German capital 24 . Thus, the Society was formally Russian, but its foundation was initiated by foreign businessmen, it was based on foreign capital. The entire equipment and engineering came from abroad as well: in 1896 a complete steel plant was transported to Nikopol from the United States, and it was launched under the supervision of American engineers. The neighboring plant called "Russian Providance" of the Mariupol Mining and Smelting Company (founded 1896, Belgium) had its engineering based on American production standards, equipment and technologies 25 . Most of the largest metallurgical plants relied on the skills of foreign specialists they employed.
Some were, however, managed by Russias, but even in these cases they utilized Western approaches, as it happened in one of the largest Russian factories, the Alekasandrovskiy South-Russian Plant in Ekaterinoslav 22 As 75% of foreign single-owners were German and Austrian, we can consider them as bearers of Western managerial models. (Bryansk Rail-rolling, Iironworks and Mechanical Plant Society). Russian director Aleksey Goryainov employed blast furnace masters from France, and the furnaces were Scottish constructions. According to the book "Pages of Plants History", written based on workers' memoirs, up to the 1890-s "almost all of the bosses were Frenchman" 26 . One can assume that the effectiveness of a corporate was determined by economies of scale and a higher level of mechanical engines. However, there is no correlation between labor productivity and size of the enterprise indicators (Table 5 ). This suggests that it was the managerial practices that determined the business success, above all the other factors. Thus, effectiveness of stock companies as compared to traditional ones can be interpreted as a transfer of Western innovation. Nevertheless, after 1900, sources suggest a massive trend of replacing foreign managers with Russians 27 . It can be explained by a number of reasons. In 1900-1903, due to the crisis, profits decreased, and owners attempted to cut the high expenses of the management and administration. Employing a Russian manager cost less, so it appeared as a possibility to economize on administrative expenses.
After 1904 one more reason emerged to minimize the presence of foreign managers. The development of the revolutionary movement was accompanied by the spread of xenophobia and anti-capitalism, bursting into direct aggression and even attack against foreign managers and engineers in a number of cases.
In addition, the language barrier with foreign managers was still an actual problem 28 
TRANSFER ANd AdAPTATION OF MANAgERIAl MOdElS
In addition to the managerial practices, Russia imported new managerial models too from the West. The first attempts to use scientific approach in operations management took place in the late 19 th century, initiated within the manufacturing industries by Frederick Taylor in the USA. The main objective was to improve economic efficiency, especially labor productivity. "The remedy from inefficiency lies in systematic management, rather than in searching for some unusual or extraordinary man. In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first" said Frederick Taylor 31 . The most important requirement towards scientific management was universality, its applicability "to all kind of human activities, from our simplest individual acts to the work of our great corporations, which call for the most elaborate cooperation"
32
. Ideas of scientific management began to penetrate into Russia almost immediately after the publication of the founders' first works. By 1917 the main works were translated into Russian 33 . A series of publications was produced by Russian authors, in which they introduced the basic ideas of the founding fathers on scientific management to their readers and interpreted those taking into consideration the Russian conditions. Such works were for example the "Scientific basics of factory management" by Leontiy Levenstern issued in 1913, the "The organization of industrial processing 29 Д.Л. Сапрыкин, Инженерное образование в России: История, концепция, перспек-тива Finding the ways of labor rationalization was, however, such a burning issue that the discussion quickly ran out of the original framework. Wellknown and widely circulated periodicals such as the "Utro Rossii" (Russia's Morning), the "Russkaya Mysl'" (Russian Thought), the "Birzhevye vedomosti" (Stock Newspaper) journals, and the "Russkiye Vedomosti" (Russian Gazette), the "Lutch" (Ray), the "Pravda" (Truth) newspapers got actively involved into the debate about the nature and prospects of Taylorism In general, the majority of Russian publications about scientific management can be characterized as critical. According to the common view, modern approaches of a large-scale administrative reshuffling of work proved to be fruitful only in the case of large, successful companies supplying a sustained massive demand. Scientific contribution of the American innovators is not to be exaggerated 41 . It is hard to tell how much Taylorism was applied in practice in the South Russian factories. In the contemporary discourse I have encountered the mentioning of three plants where they attempted to adapt the principles of scientific management: two in St. Petersburg and the Nikolaev Shipyard 42 . In his paper, Professor Eduard Koritsky referred to eight enterprises organized according to Taylor's principles before World War I, "whereas in France -only one enterprise" 43 , without, however, specifying all these plants and his sources. Thus, to find out whether there are any more details available about an eventual practical implementation of managerial theories is the task of further archival research.
CONClUSIONS
The analysis of the sources confirms that foreign entrepreneurs imported to Russia modern managerial practices and models too besides capital and advanced technologies. Small firms were gradually replaced by modern enterprises, and foreigners played an important part in this process. Foreign entrepreneurs copied the structure and management principles of Western-European companies, and the largest companies employed also foreign engineers, managers and workers.
Taking metallurgy companies as an example, an analysis of the efficiency in the context of ownership structure showed that the key to success did not lie in the size of the enterprise. The operations management -the "Visible hand" -had a significant influence in this respect.
It appears that the role of foreign managers was especially important in the initial stage of the industrialization of Russia. Although there were companies that wanted and could afford to hire foreign managers after 1900 too, foreigners were in general successfully replaced by Russian managers. Many Russian engineers and managers adopted operational managerial practices borrowed from the Western colleagues, and there appears to be no difference in their efficiency from the latter ones as it is reflected by the comparison of data.
There are no direct sources on how and in what extent did the particular managers consider and elaborate on the theories and models of management that evolved in America in the late 19 th century. It was present in the public discussion in Russia as reflected by the books and periodicals issued in the period. A possible step forward in the research is to expand it on further groups of archival documents, first and foremost on manufacturing documentation of enterprises stored in Ukrainian, Russian and Western European archives that might contain documents on the practical application of such theories.
